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CITIZEN ATTITUDES ON POLITICIANS’ PAY:  
TRUST ISSUES ARE NOT SOLVED BY DELEGATION  
  
Rasmus T. Pedersen (VIVE – The Danish Center for Social Science Research) 
Lene H. Pedersen (University of Copenhagen and VIVE) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Citizens are generally opposed to politicians receiving a high pay. We investigate the degree to 
which this aversion is moderated by citizens’ individual-level trust in politicians and whether 
institutional delegation can moderate the reactions to proposed changes in politicians’ pay. Using 
a survey experiment, we confirm that trust in politicians is a key predictor of attitudes regarding 
their pay. Distrust towards politicians seems to matter much more than general attitudes on 
income inequality when citizens form opinions on politicians’ pay. Furthermore, citizens’ 
aversion to high pay for politicians is affected by institutional delegation, but such delegation only 
lessens the opposition to pay raises modestly, leaving most citizens firmly against pay raises for 
politicians. Finally, while citizens’ trust in politicians matters greatly for their attitudes regarding 
politicians pay, proposed changes in politicians’ pay do not conversely affect citizen’s perceptions 
of the politicians.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1816, protesters burned members of the US Congress in effigy after the congress members 
had enacted a pay raise for themselves (Theriault, 2004). Two centuries later, citizens’ dislike of 
high pay for politicians persists. Several studies across a diverse array of countries show that vast 
majorities of citizens in all of these countries believe that politicians should receive substantially 
lower salaries than they currently do (Kelley and Evans, 1993; Kiatpongsan and Norton, 2014; 
Mause, 2014). While this general aversion towards high pay for politicians is well-established, 
there are, however, several reasons to further investigate these attitudes.  
First, the salary of politicians is an important policy issue in its own right. Public opinion on this 
issue is important because it may affect the actual salary levels of politicians, which may again 
have consequences for the recruitment and behavior of politicians (Braendle, 2015; Carnes and 
Hansen, 2016; Fisman, et al. 2015; Hoffman and Lyons, 2013; Keane and Merlo, 2010).  
Second, in contrast to nearly all other vocations, national politicians typically have the power to 
set their own wages (Brans and Peters, 2012; Mause, 2014). We argue that, because of this 
institutional feature, citizens’ attitudes on politicians’ pay are closely connected to perceptions 
regarding politicians’ self-interest and therefore also trust in the politicians, which is a key 
indicator of political legitimacy (Turper and Aarts, 2017). Building on the litterature 
regarding political trust (e.g., Keele, 2007; Levi and Stoker, 2000), stealth democracy 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002) and deservingness (e.g., Feather, 1999; Petersen, 2012), 
we theorize that low levels of trust towards politicians is a key explanation for the publics’ 
aversion to high pay for politicians. In addition, we also suggest that changes in politicians’ 
pay could potentially be used as an instrument to increase trust in politicians. 
Third, because of the relationship between citizens’ low trust in the politicians and their 
attitudes on these politicians’ pay, this issue provides a fitting test case on the advantages of 
policy delegation to an independent agency. Delegation of decision making authority to 
independent agencies is often recommended as a way to increase credibility and trust by 
tying the hands of politicians, who could otherwise be tempted to act on their short -sighted 
self-interest (Gilardi, 2002; Majone, 1997). Indeed, politicians in a number of countries have 
chosen to delegate the authority to set their own wages to independent institutions (Brans and 
Peters, 2012; Mause, 2014). We propose that such delegation might abate citizens’ aversion to pay 
raises for politicians.  
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To investigate citizens’ reactions to proposed changes on politicians’ pay, we use a survey 
experiment (n~2,000), where we randomly assign respondents to different scenarios regarding 
politicians’ pay. Our results show that attitudes towards politicians’ pay are indeed closely related 
to political trust, which is a more important predictor of pay attitudes than general attitudes on 
economic inequality. Further, we show that delegating the issue of politicians’ pay to an 
independent agency can affect citizens’ reactions to such changes. However, institutional 
delegation does not change the fact that the average citizen remains staunchly opposed to pay 
increases for politicians. Finally, while changes in politicians pay has been proposed as a way of 
increasing the public’s trust in them (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002), our results do not 
indicate that such an initiative would be efficacious. A reduction of their own wages is not 
necessarily a silver bullet for politicians hoping to increase the electorate’s trust in them. 
 
ATTITUDES ON PAY FOR POLITICIANS 
Full-time politicians in modern democracies generally have substantially higher incomes than the 
average citizen (Brans and Peters, 2012; Peters and Hood, 1994; Mause, 2014). This high level of 
compensation seems to irk the public, and when politicians enact a pay raise for themselves, it is 
often followed by widespread condemnation and opposition from the news media and from 
citizens (Baimbridge and Darcy, 1999; Jones, 2007; Theriault, 2004). Furthermore, survey data 
from 40 countries show that, across all of these countries, majorities of voters think that 
politicians (specifically cabinet ministers) receive more than they ought to (Kelley and Evans, 
1993; Kiatpongsan and Norton, 2014).1 Thus, the current knowledge clearly suggests that it is 
reasonable to expect some aversion to pay raises for politicians, and our study takes departure in 
the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1. Citizens show higher support for a pay decrease than a pay increase for 
politicians. 
While previous studies suggest that aversion to pay raises for politicians is to be expected, there is 
still little knowledge regarding the determinants and mechanisms behind this attitude. In the 
                                                     
1 Pedersen and Mutz (2018) have shown that survey measures of pay preferences are highly affected by anchoring 
effects and ratio bias. These problems with the measures do not, however, undermine the finding that people would 
generally prefer to adjust the pay of politicians downwards.  
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following section, we theorize how attitudes regarding proposed pay changes for politicians may 
depend on the sponsor of such proposals.   
THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION 
There are substantial differences in the degree to which national politicians can set their own 
wages. In a majority of European national parliaments and in the US Congress, the politicians 
can set their own wages, albeit with some restrictions. However, in a few countries, politicians 
have delegated the right to determine their pay to independent entities. This is for example the 
case in Great Britain, where politicians’ pay are set by the Independent Parliamentary Standards 
Authority, in Sweden where the task has been delegated to Riksdagens arvodesnämnd (Brans and 
Peters, 2012; Mause, 2014), and partly in Denmark, where the task was temporarily delegated to 
an independent commission in 2014 (Vederlagskommisionen, 2016). 
To what degree might such institutional delegation affect how citizens react to proposed changes 
in politicians’ pay? If citizens’ aversion to high pay for politicians was driven purely by attitudes 
regarding income and economic inequality, the sponsor of a proposed change in politicians’ 
wages should not matter. However, to the degree that citizens’ aversion to high pay for 
politicians is driven by their perceptions of—and attitudes towards—the politicians, the sponsor 
of such a proposed change in wages could affect attitudes regarding the proposal. To see how 
that might be the case, it is worth taking a closer look at the relationship between citizens’ 
perceptions of politicians’ self-interest, and citizens’ trust towards the politicians.  
Traditionally, studies of citizens’ trust in politicians have often focused on the degree to 
which such attitudes are affected by policy outputs and outcomes (Citrin , 1974; Keele, 2007; 
Whiteley et al., 2016). However, citizens do not just care about outputs, they also care about 
how decisions come about, also termed procedural fairness (Bøggild and Petersen, 2016). 
Hence, as argued by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), the low esteem to which politicians 
are held is not necessarily a result of dissatisfaction with the output of the political system. 
Rather, citizens are dissatisfied with the political processes preceding the output . A key issue 
regarding this political process is, according to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), the degree to 
which the politicians concern themselves with societal interests as opposed to special interests, 
including their own personal interests. People are ‘amazingly attuned, hypersensitive even, to the 
possibility that decision makers will attempt to improve themselves at the expense of everyone else’ (Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse, 2002, p. 85). Thus, the argument goes, current dissatisfaction with policitians 
is largely caused by the perception that politicians are overly self-interested.  
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Following this line of reasoning, we should expect citizens to react strongly against any action 
by politicians that may be construed as being driven by self-interest. The problem with a pay 
increase for politicians is therefore not simply the level of pay in itself, but rather that such a 
proposal sends a signal of self-interest if the proposal is sponsored by the politicians themselves. 
In contrast, a proposed pay increase for politicians coming from an independent entity is not in 
the same way a clear signal of politicians being self-interested, and citizens might therefore react 
less negatively to a proposal from such a sponsor. Conversely, if politicians themselves suggest 
that their own wages should be decreased, citizens might tend to see this as an indication of 
relative selflessness of these politician. Therefore, citizens may be particular supportive of such a 
proposal coming straight from the politicians. Accordingly, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2.  Citizens show lower support for a pay increase when the proposal is 
coming from an actor that appears to be closely connected to the politicians themselves 
(Compared to a proposal coming from an actor that appears to not be closely connected 
to the politicians themselves).  
Hypothesis 3. Citizens show higher support for a pay decrease when the proposal is 
coming from an actor that appears to be closely connected to the politicians themselves 
(Compared to a proposal coming from an actor that appears to not be closely connected 
to the politicians themselves). 
It is worth noting that our argument resembles the explanation for delegation found in agency 
theory: when policy-makers tie their hands and delegate powers to independent entities, this may 
increase the credibility and legitimacy of decisions, because these decisions are thereby shielded 
from the short term self-interests of these policy-makers (Gilardi, 2002; Majone, 1997, p. 139–
40). 
While hypotheses 2 and 3 focus on the effect that institutional factors may have for citizens’ 
reactions to proposals regarding pay for politicians, the next section addresses how individual-
level characteristics of the citizens may also moderate their reactions to such proposals. 
Specifically, we theorize that citizens’ existing levels of trust towards politicians moderates their 
reactions to pay changes, and we consider another moderator, namely attitudes regarding 
economic inequality. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CITIZENS’ POLITICAL TRUST AND INEQUALITY ATTITUDES 
 In this section, we argue that citizens’ level of trust in politicians may be a key factor in 
explaining their reactions to pay changes for politicians. Before we do so, it is worth noting 
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that recent decades have seen substantial drops in political trust across western democracies 
(Keele, 2007; Turper and Aarts, 2017; Whiteley et al., 2016). This development is potentially 
troublesome, because trust towards politicians is a key indicator of political legitimacy and 
often regarded as a prerequisite for well-functioning and stable political systems (Kelley and 
Zagorski, 2004; Turper and Aarts, 2017).  
Studies on perceptions of deservingness have found that key factors in people’s judgement of the 
deservingness of others are their like or dislike of the other and perceptions about the others’ 
moral character (Feather, 1999, Feather, 2015). As noted by Feather (1999), these perceptions 
consist, amongst other thing, of assessments regarding the others’ integrity and trustworthiness. 
Recent studies have confirmed that assessments regarding individuals’ deservingness have a 
strong effect on people’s willingness to support the poor and unemployed (Petersen, 2012; 
Petersen, et al. 2012), and it also seems to play an important role for people’s judgments of the 
deservingness of high-income groups (Hansen, 2018; Ragusa, 2014). Thus, such perceptions 
regarding deservingness seems to have strong effect across different strata of society. In so far as 
our moral assessment of other individuals are associated with our trust in these individuals, as 
suggested by Feather (1999), it is therefore also reasonably to expect citizens’ trust in politicians 
to play a role in their attitudes regarding pay for these politicians. In the context of this study, we 
would therefore expect that citizens with low levels of trust towards politicians find these 
politicians to be less deserving of a high pay. Conversely, citizens with a high level of trust should 
be relatively more accepting of a high pay for politicians. Consequently, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. Citizens with a high level of political trust show lower relative support for 
a pay decrease than citizens low on political trust.  
In order to assess the relative importance of trust, we now turn our focus towards what we view 
to be the primary alternative explanation for citizens’ aversion to high pay for politicians, namely 
general aversion to economic inequality. National politicians typically receive a pay that puts them 
well above the mean of the income distribution (Brans and Peters, 2012; Peters and Hood, 1994). 
Aversion to such a high pay for politicians may therefore also to some degree be driven by a 
general aversion towards economic inequality. Numerous studies across countries and time 
periods show that large parts of the populations find current levels of inequality and the wages of 
high-income groups such as CEOs to be unreasonably high (Bartels, 2005; Kelley and Zagorski, 
2004; McCall, 2013; Osberg and Smeeding, 2006). To the extent that a preference for lower pay 
for politicians is explained by such a general aversion to high levels of inequality, there is nothing 
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particularly unique about the preferences regarding pay for politicians; politicians are merely part 
of a larger high-income group, and citizens with relatively egalitarian preferences would prefer 
lower incomes for this group. Following this line of reasoning, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5. Citizens with a high level of aversion to economic inequality show higher 
relative support for a pay decrease than citizens low on inequality aversion.  
REVERSING THE CAUSAL ARROW: CAN CHANGES IN PAY AFFECT TRUST? 
If distrust towards politicians is driven by the perception that they are excessively self-interested, 
could politicians potentially increase the publics’ trust in them simply by decreasing their own 
pay? Notably, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, p. 217) highlighted reforms of remuneration to 
elected officials as the main place to look when considering potential remedies to the low political 
trust, Similarly, that the pay received by politicians could affect trust in them had also been 
suggested by Peters and Hood (1994). However, Peters and Hood did not empirically test this 
proposed relationship, nor did Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), perhaps because they had, in 
the end, little faith in the efficacy of such an initiative. While they found pay decreases for 
politicians to be worthy of consideration, they ended up stating, rather pessimistically, that: ‘We do 
not believe the people can be convinced, even after serious reform, that politicians are behaving in a non-self-
interested manner’ (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002, p. 220). Nevertheless, the possibility of pay 
changes affecting citizens’ trust in politicians has had such a prominent role in the literature that 
an empirical test seems sensible. Therefore, we also investigate the potential downstream effects 
of pay changes on trust.  
When looking at these potential effects, it is also worthwhile elaborating on the exact nature of 
trust. In the numerous existing investigations of political trust, this concept is usually treated as a 
unidimensional construct. However, when we judge the trustworthiness of other individuals or 
groups, we generally judge them on two dimensions. The first dimension involves the 
commitment to act in the interests of the truster, and when someone is called trustworthy, it is 
often a reference to this commitment. However, there is also a second dimension to 
trustworthiness, namely the trustee’s competence in a given domain (Levi and Stoker, 2000).2  
                                                     
2  Trust in intentions is sometimes referred to as moral trust, while pragmatic trust  refers to trust in aptitude (Bøggild, 
2016) 
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This two-dimensional perspective on the concept of trust aligns very well with the stereotype 
content model (SCM), according to which people assess other individuals or groups on two 
fundamental dimensions, competence and warmth (Judd et al., 2005). The dimension of warmth 
reflects traits related to an individual’s (or group’s) intentions, such as friendliness and 
helpfulness, whereas the dimension of competence captures traits related to the individual’s 
abilities, such as intelligence and skills in general (Koch and Obermaier, 2016).  
There are good reasons to investigate both dimensions of trust in this study. According to 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), peoples’ distrust towards politicians is primarily distrust 
towards their intentions, i.e., their warmth. Following their perspective, we expect that proposals 
regarding higher pay for politicians will primarily affect trust in politicians’ warmth. In the interest 
of completeness and in order to compare potential effects on the two dimensions of trust, 
however, we also test for any effects of trust in politicians’ competence. We therefore propose 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6. Citizens exposed to a proposed pay increase have lower levels of trust in 
politicians' warmth than citizens exposed to a proposed pay decrease.  
Hypothesis 7. Citizens exposed to a proposed pay increase have lower levels of trust in 
politicians' competence than citizens exposed to a proposed pay decrease.  
Finally, the degree to which proposed changes to politicians’ pay affect trust in these politicians 
could depend not just on the proposed change, but also of the sponsor of such a proposal. 
Specifically, voters should be expected to update their perceptions regarding politicians more 
when exposed to a proposal coming from these politicians rather than some other, independent, 
actor. Thus, the final hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 8. The effect of a proposed pay change will be higher when the proposal is 
coming from an actor that appears to be closely connected to the politicians themselves. 
 
EXPERIMENT 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a survey experiment in Denmark. The income of 
politicians in the Danish parliament is approximately 1.7 times larger than the salary of the 
average Danish citizen. Comparatively speaking, this is a relatively small pay gap, and all but four 
countries among 27 EU-countries have larger pay gaps between national politicians and the 
average citizen (Mause, 2014). Furthermore, despite recent declines, Danish voters still have 
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comparatively high levels of political trust, (Erkel and Meer, 2016; Torcal, 2017). As such, the 
Danish case can be seen as a least likely case when it comes to opposition towards high pay for 
politicians. While there are, just like in other countries, sometimes stories in the Danish news 
media about the pays and perks of politicians and other high income groups, there were no 
salient news stories on this issue at the time of our experiment. 
Prior to any data collection, the study was preregistered on Open Science Framework.3 The 
experiment was conducted in a commercial web panel (Voxmeter), where panel members were 
invited by email to participate.4 A total of 2,196 respondents started the survey, and 2,001 
respondents completed the questionnaire, corresponding to a completion rate of 91.1 per cent. 
More important for our ability to use the experimental data for casual inferences, most of the 
drop off occurred prior to exposure to the experimental stimuli. Among the 2,033 respondents 
exposed to the experimental stimuli, 98.4 per cent completed the questionnaire. The miniscule 
drop off after exposure to the experimental stimuli did not differ significantly between the 
experimental conditions (2(4, N = 2,033) = 1.74, p=0.78). The final sample was approximately 
representative of the adult Danish population on gender (50.2 per cent female) and age (M=49.8 
years, SD=17.8), while the educational level in the sample was somewhat higher than in the 
general population. For sample and population characteristics, see appendix A.  
DESIGN 
At the start of the survey, respondents were asked standard questions on demographics and vote 
choice, and they were asked to place themselves on an 11-point political left-right scale, ranging 
from zero to ten (In our analyses, all continuous variables have subsequently been standardized 
to range from zero to one). Respondents were then asked two questions regarding their specific 
attitude on economic inequality. Together, respondents’ left-right self-placement and these two 
specific inequality questions formed a reliable index on inequality aversion (Cronbach’s α=0.71). 
Next, respondents were asked about their general level of trust towards politicians on an 11-point 
left right scale, ranging from zero to ten (The distributions of respondents’ values across these 
two measures are shown in appendix A). 
                                                     
3 The pre-registration form is publicly available at OSF Registries, https://osf.io/wzupq. The order of the 
hypotheses differs from the order in the pre-registration (due to presentational considerations). Further, following 
the suggestion from an anonymous reviewer, the parenthetical sentences in hypotheses 2 and 3 have been added in 
order to increase the clarity of the hypotheses.  
4 The survey was fielded on 18 December 2017.  
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Respondents were then exposed to the experimental stimuli. They were asked to read a brief 
description of a commission, which suggested changes in the wages of the politicians in the 
Danish national parliament. Following our hypotheses, we manipulated two factors in the 
experiment: (1) Whether respondents were exposed to a scenario were the commission proposed 
a decrease or an increase in wages, and (2) whether this commission was presented a being closely 
connected to the politicians themselves or independent of these politicians. In the conditions where the 
commission was described as being closely aligned with the politicians, respondents were 
informed that the commission had been set up by the politicians in the Danish parliament, that 
the current politicians had appointed the commissions members, and that a majority of these 
commission members were themselves former politicians. In the remainder of the article, we use 
the shorthand ‘political commission’ for this description of the commission. In the conditions where 
the commission was presented as independent of the politicians, respondents were told that the 
commission was completely independent, that members of the commission were experts with 
knowledge of the conditions on the Danish labor market, and that the members were not 
members of the parliament themselves.5 We use the term ‘independent commission’ when referring to 
this description of the commission (The exact wording of all conditions is included in the survey 
questionnaire in appendix B). 
These different descriptions of the commission were all in line with an actual commission, 
Vederlagskommissionen, which was set up in Denmark in 2014 and presented their proposals 
regarding politicians’ pay approximately two years before our experiment was conducted. Most 
members of this commission were indeed former politicians but they were also selected for their 
expertise. Thus, our varying descriptions of the commission were not deceptive. Rather, they 
were simply different ways of framing the commission (We did however change the exact 
content of the commission’s proposal in order to maximize simplicity and stringency).6  
                                                     
5 We describe members of this independent commission as experts to mimic the real world, where experts have been 
the main alternative to politicians themselves, when determining wages of politicians (Brans and Peters, 2012; Mause, 
2014, Vederlagskommisionen, 2016). However, members of an independent commission could principally be 
selected on other criteria, for example laypeople chosen to be representative of the general population. 
6 To keep the stimuli simple, we also opted not to include information regarding current pay levels of the politicians. 
It is surprisingly complicated to present specific numbers on the pay of the Danish politicians, because their benefits 
encompass not only an ordinary salary, but also a tax exempt supplement and other special retirement benefits 
(Vederlagskommisionen, 2016)    
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We chose to expose respondents to a scenario closely resembling real world processes regarding 
politicians pay in order to increase the external validity and relevance of the experiment. A 
potential disadvantage to this choice is that it may have limited the strength of the stimuli, for 
example by presenting the members of the political commission as former, rather than current, 
politicians. We assume, however, that respondents will tend to see both former and current 
politicians as part of the same group, in particular because our stimuli highlighted that members 
of the political commission were selected by current parliamentarians. In other words, they acted 
on behalf of the current politicians, their former colleagues. Another potential disadvantage of 
using experimental stimuli based on real life events is that respondents might react to current 
discussions about this event rather than just the experimental stimuli. However, while there had 
been some debate surrounding the commission’s proposal almost two years prior to our 
experiment, the proposal of the commissions had all but completely vanished from the public 
agenda at the time of our experiment.7 
Our experiment was full factorial, so this manipulation of the two factors resulted in four 
experimental conditions. In addition, a control group was not exposed to any proposal or 
description of a commission, meaning that the experiment had a total of five conditions. 
POST-TREATMENT MEASURES 
After reading the description of the commission and their proposal, respondents were asked to 
indicate their support or opposition to the proposal on a five-point scale, ranging from ‘strongly 
opposed’ to ‘strongly in favor.’ Next, trust in politicians’ warmth and competence were measured 
with two questions batteries, containing items adapted from previous trait and trust studies 
(Bøggild, 2016; Fridkin and Kenney, 2011; Funk, 1999; Harring, 2015; Koch and Obermaier, 
2016; Pedersen, 2017). An index for trust in warmth was based on four of these items (6d, 6e, 6f, 
and 7c), forming a reliable scale (α=0.84).8 The index for trust in competence was based on five 
items (6a, 6b, 6c, 7a, and 7b), also forming a reliable scale (α=0.89).  The distributions of 
respondents’ values across these two measures are shown in Appendix A. While our post-
treatment measures of trust specifically measure the two dimensions underlying trust (warmth 
and competence), our pre-treatment measure of trust only addresses general political trust (c.f. 
                                                     
7 A database search on all the major Danish newspapers showed that the commission had been mentioned only six 
times in the six months leading up to our experiment [Search on ‘vederlagskommissionen’ for the period from 18 June 
2017 until 18 December 2017 on the database Infomedia]. 
8 In accordance with the pre-registration analysis plan, a fifth item (7d) was excluded from the index because it 
decreased the internal reliability of the scale. 
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hypothesis 4). This feature of the survey was based on considerations regarding the risk of 
respondent fatigue and survey cost (all three measures of trust correlate strongly, see appendix 
C). 
Respondents were then asked two questions that served as checks of our experimental 
manipulation. First, respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they thought that the 
politicians in parliament had influenced the proposal of the commission. Second, respondents 
were probed on their ability to remember the content of the proposal. Finally, respondents were 
debriefed (See appendix B for the entire survey questionnaire). 
RESULTS 
As specified in our preregistration analysis plan, the tests of the hypotheses are based on 
regression models (OLS), which include as predictor variables: dummies for experimental 
conditions, the pre-treatment measures of political trust and inequality attitude, as well as 
interaction terms of the experimental conditions and trust, and the experimental conditions and 
inequality attitude. Detailed results for all the planned models are shown in Appendix D. 
THE MAIN EFFECTS OF PROPOSAL CONTENT AND DELEGATION 
We start the analysis by looking at the effect of proposal contents on support for proposal. 
Figure 1 below shows that—just as expected—there are strong preferences for pay decreases for 
politicians relative to pay increases (Figure 1 is based on Model 1 in appendix D). Respondents 
exposed to the suggested pay increases, from either the political commission or the independent 
commission, exhibited very low support for the proposal. In contrast, respondents exposed to a 
proposed decrease in politicians’ pay were much more strongly in support for this proposal.9 As 
evident from Figure 1, these differences between the first two condition and the last two 
conditions are highly significant (p<0.001). These results are clearly in line with hypothesis 1.   
                                                     
9  Just 4.1 per cent of respondents provided a ‘don’t know’ answer, when asked about their opinion on the proposal 
presented to them. These respondents answering were excluded from this part of the analyses, following the 
preregistration analysis plan. 
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The results illustrated in Figure 1 also allow us to test hypotheses 2 and 3. In line with the 
prediction in hypothesis 2, pay increases are even more unpopular when suggested by the 
political committee rather than an independent committee. A proposed increase from the 
political commission had a mean value on the measure of support of just 0.25 (95% CI[0.22-
0.27]), while support was 0.30 (95% CI[0.27-0.32]) when the independent commission suggested 
the increase (the two means differ significantly from each other, p=0.007). This result suggests 
that aversion to high pay for politicians to some degree may be driven by an aversion to 
politicians being overly self-interested, not just the high pay in itself. Accordingly, delegation of 
such decisions to independent entities can in fact lessen opposition However, it should be noted 
that while the effect of the sponsor is statistically significant, it is relatively small, moving support 
on the scale ranging from zero to one with just 0.05 points (95% CI[0.01-0.08]). Furthermore, we 
do not see the same pattern when looking at the two groups being exposed to proposed 
decreases in pay. Here, support for the proposal seems to be completely unaffected by the 
sponsor of the proposal. Support for a pay decrease suggested by the political commission is 0.68 
(95% CI[0.65-0.70]) just as it is 0.68 (95% CI[0.65-0.70]) when proposed by the independent 
commission (The differences between means is just 0.0005 points and insignificant, p=0.978). 
Thus, while we find support for hypothesis 2, the data do not support hypothesis 3. 
POLITICAL TRUST AS A MODERATOR 
Next, we turn to the moderating role of political trust. An estimation based on model 1 shows 
that the expected support for an increase in pay is significantly higher for higher levels of trust, 
regardless of whether this proposal originates from the political commission or the independent 
commission. Conversely, expected support for a pay decrease is significantly lower when trust 
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level are high, again regardless of whether the proposal came from the political or independent 
commission (The marginal effect of trust is significant, p<0.001, in all conditions, see appendix 
D, table D2). These results are clearly in line with hypothesis 4. Furthermore, the differences in 
responses across trust levels are not just statistically significant; they are also substantive in size. 
To illustrate this, Figure 2 displays the expected support for the proposals for an individual with a 
low level of trust (one standard deviation below the mean) and a high level of trust (one standard 
deviation above the mean).10  
 
As shown in Figure 2, an individual with a low trust level has a very high level of expected 
support for a pay decrease, regardless of whether the proposal is coming from the political 
commission or the independent commission. Averaging across these two conditions, a low 
trusting individual has an expected support of 0.76 on the 0-1 scale. In contrast, when presented 
with a proposed pay increase, an individual with a low level of trust, has an expected support for 
this proposal of only 0.17 (again, averaging across the two conditions presenting pay increases). 
Thus, for such individuals with low trust, the relative preference for a pay decrease (i.e., the 
difference in support for a decrease and an increase) is estimated to be 0.59 points. In contrast, 
individuals with a high level of trust have a relative preference for a pay decrease of just 0.21 
points (for an individual with a high level of trust, the expected level of support is 0.59 for a pay 
decrease and 0.38 for a pay increase). This marked difference of 0.39 points in relative 
preferences is significant, p<0.001.  
                                                     
10 One SD below the mean is 0.22 on the trust measure, while one SD above the mean is 0.67.  These 
postestimations based on mean±SD were not described in the preregistration analysis plan. 
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It is important to note that while these results align with our theoretical reasoning on the 
moderating effects of trust, a causal interpretation of the results is of course based on the 
assumption that the apparent effects are not confounded by unobserved variables that 
simultaneously affect trust and support for this proposal. Such confounders cannot be ruled out, 
but it is also worth noting that the analysis is based on a regression which controls for the effect 
of inequality attitudes (Political trust and inequality aversion correlate negatively, although not 
very strongly, r=-0.19, p<0.001, c.f. appendix C). In addition, an exploratory analysis shows that 
if we add to the model additional covariates (gender, age, education and party choice) as well as 
interactions between these covariates and treatment, the moderating role of trust remains 
substantially unchanged (See appendix D, table D2).  
INEQUALITY ATTITUDES AS A MODERATOR 
As the next step, we look at the moderating role of inequality aversion. Notably, the expected 
support for a pay increase for politicians does not increase significantly with higher levels of 
acceptance of economic inequality. The marginal effect is insignificant when respondents are 
exposed to an increase proposed by the political commission (p=0.811), and it is also 
insignificant for respondents exposed to an increase proposed by the independent political 
commission (p=0.060). However, for the respondents exposed to a proposed decrease, the 
marginal effect of inequality attitudes is significantly negative, regardless of whether the proposal 
is coming from a the political or the independent commission (p=0.002 in both cases). Thus, the 
relative support for a pay decrease is higher among individuals with a high level of inequality 
aversion, as proposed by hypotheses 5. Once again, these results are robust to the inclusion of 
additional covariates (see appendix D, table D2). 
Again, to get a better grasp of the substantive differences, we can compare the expected values 
for an individual low on inequality aversion (one standard deviation below the mean) versus an 
individual high on inequality aversion (one standard deviation above the mean). Figure 3 below 
illustrates support for the proposal, conditional on experimental treatment and aversion to 
economic inequality. The measure of inequality aversion is scaled 0-1, where a high value 
indicates a high level of inequality aversion. 
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Here, a respondent with a low level of aversion to economic inequality would have an expected 
relative preference for a pay decrease of 0.35 points, whereas a respondent placed one standard 
deviation above the mean would have an expected relative preference for a pay decrease of 0.46 
points (These effects do differ significantly from each other, p<0.001). Compared to the 
moderating role of trust, the moderating role of inequality aversion seems modest. A formal test 
confirms this: partial omega squared for the interaction between experimental condition and trust 
is 0.125 (95% CI[0.095-0.155]), while it is just 0.010 (95% CI[0.001-0.021]) for the interaction 
between experimental condition and inequality attitude. 
So far, we have seen that, overall, respondents have strong preferences for politicians receiving a 
pay decrease relative to a pay increase (in line with hypothesis 1). This aversion is even more 
pronounced when an increase is being suggested by the political commission (in line with 
hypothesis 2), whereas the sponsor did not have a significant effect on the popularity of a pay 
decrease (disconfirming hypothesis 3). Furthermore, we have seen that this relative preference for 
a pay decrease is moderated by political trust (in line with hypothesis 4) and inequality attitudes 
(in line with hypothesis 5), and that the moderating role of trust is larger than the moderating role 
of inequality attitudes. Thus, taken together it seems that trust really does matter a great deal for 
attitudes on pay. Low trust towards politicians is clearly associated with preferences for low pay. 
In the last part of the analysis, we see whether this relationship between trust and pay could 
perhaps work in the other direction.  
FROM PAY CHANGES TO TRUST  
Are proposed changes in politicians’ pay an efficacious way of affecting citizens’ trust in these 
politicians? The results of our study suggest that the answer to this question is no. As illustrated 
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in Figure 4, none of the experimental treatments or the control group differed from each other 
when comparing the mean levels of trust in politicians’ warmth (all differences between 
conditions are statistically insignificant, p>0.05). Similarly, none of the conditions, differed from 
each other when comparing the mean levels of trust in politicians’ competence. These results are 
not in line with hypothesis 6 and 7, which posited that citizens exposed to a proposed pay 
increase should end up with lower levels of trust in politicians' warmth and competence than 
citizens exposed to a proposed pay decrease. 
 
The lack of significant effects could potentially be due to our measures of trust in politicians’ 
warmth and competence. However, we note that both of these measures correlates fairly strongly 
with the more traditional pre-treatment measure of trust in politicians (c.f. appendix C). 
Furthermore, several of the items used in our scales of trust in warmth and trust in competence 
have previously been used as standard measures of political trust.11 Even if we look separately at 
these typical measures of political trust, the null-finding stands.  
Finally, without any significant effects on either dimensions of trust, there is no support for 
hypothesis 8, which proposed that effect sizes would be larger when a proposal came from the 
                                                     
11 For trust in warmth, the traditional trust items are ‘Politicians generally have good intentions’ (e.g., Mutz and Reeves, 
2005) and ‘Most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally’ (e.g., Harring, 2015). For trust in 
competence, the traditional trust items are ‘Most politicians are competent people who know what they are doing’ (e.g., 
Adriaansen, Prag and Vreese, 2010) and ‘In general, you can trust that the politicians make the right decisions for the country’ 
(e.g., Bøggild, 2016). 
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political commission: differences in effects size are insignificant for trust in warmth (p=0.95) as 
well as for trust in competence (p=0.84). 
Why are the respondents’ trust in politicians so unaffected by the proposed pay changes? One 
explanation could be that our experimental treatment simply wasn’t strong enough. For example, 
respondents were exposed to a potential, not an actual, change in pay. Another possible 
explanation for this lack of a significant effects on the two types of trust could be that 
respondents had not paid attention or remembered the content of the proposals presented to 
them. However, at the end of the survey, when asked to recall the proposed percentage change in 
politicians pay among four alternatives, 81.6 per cent of respondents correctly remembered the 
percentage (9.0 per cent of the respondents replied ‘don’t know,’ while 9.4 per cent of the 
respondents gave an incorrect answer).12 We suggest that at least some part of the explanation for 
these null-effects could also be that respondents’ had a tendency to interpret the proposals on 
pay changes in ways which confirmed their generally skeptical view of the politicians. Related to 
this, Figure 5 shows the respondents’ mean assessment of the extent to which the parliamentary 
politicians influenced the proposed pay change. As one can see, respondents did respond to the 
description of the commissions. Conditional on the other experimental factor (i.e., pay decrease 
versus increase), respondents did perceive the independent commission as being less influenced 
by the politicians than the political commission. As such, our manipulation of this factor worked 
as intended.  
 
                                                     
12 Following the pre-registrations analyses plan, respondents failing to provide the correct answer to this question 
were not excluded from the analyses (c.f., Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres, 2018). 
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However, the content of the proposal also had substantial effects on respondents’ perceptions 
regarding the independence of the commission. For example, when the independent commission 
suggested a pay increase, the mean assessment of influence from the parliamentary politicians 
(i.e., the politicians benefitting from such an increase) was 0.56 (95% CI[0.53-0.59]), while it was 
just 0.37 (95% CI[0.34-0.40), when the same commission suggested a pay decrease (We see the 
same pattern when comparing the increase and decrease from the political commission). Thus, 
whenever a pay increase is suggested, respondents generally assume that politicians had some 
influence on this proposal, and such proposals may therefore simply confirm peoples’ prior 
notions of self-interested politicians. In contrast, when a pay decrease is suggested, respondents 
tend to believe that politicians had a limited influence on the proposal, even when the proposal 
came from the political commission. Respondents with prior notions of politicians being self-
interested, may thereby retain this notion by assuming that the politicians had relatively little to 
do with this proposal. 
This response pattern seems to us to be a typical example of directional motivated reasoning, 
where previously held attitudes structure how new information is interpreted (Leeper and 
Slothuus, 2014). This explanation of the null-effects on trust is further corroborated by an 
additional exploratory analysis: the perceptions of political influence on the pay proposal are 
particularly affected by the content of the proposal among the respondents with low pre-
treatment levels of trust. In contrast, respondents with a high pre-treatment level of trust 
generally respond more strongly to the description of the commission (See appendix E for this 
additional analysis).  
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The relatively strong preference for lower pay for politicians found among the participants in our 
study corresponds well with earlier studies, all showing majorities of voters to be averse to high 
pay for politicians (Kelley and Evans, 1993; Kiatpongson and Norton, 2014; Theriault, 2004). 
Thus, our study adds further weight to the assertion that aversion to high pay for politicians is a 
general phenomenon across different contexts. In fact, our finding on the importance of political 
trust for these pay attitudes suggests that Denmark, where trust in politicians is still comparatively 
high, should be one of the countries were we should have been least likely to find a strong 
aversion to higher pay for politicians. 
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As shown by our experiment, this aversion towards pay raises for politicians can be lessened 
through institutional delegation. Reactions to proposed pay changes do depend on the sponsor of 
such proposals, as opposition to a pay raise for politicians was weaker when it was proposed by 
an independent commission instead of a commission closely aligned with the politicians. 
However, while the effect of such delegation was statistically significant, it is important to note 
that it was substantially modest. The limited size of the effect may partly be due to the fact that 
people’s perceptions regarding politicians’ influence on pay proposals are heavily affected by the 
content of such proposals. Whenever people were presented with a proposal containing a pay 
raise for politicians, they generally assumed some influence over this proposal from the 
politicians themselves, even when the commission was described as being independent. In 
contrast, politicians generally get far less credit for proposals containing a pay decrease.  
Furthermore, this tendency to view the independence of the commission in light of their 
proposals, was most pronounced among respondents with low levels of political trust. Thus, 
these people that one might expect to be most strongly in favor of institutional delegation—
because it would take decisions out of the hands of ostensibly untrustworthy politicians—are also 
the people that tend to distrust that this delegation is genuine. This pattern relates to a key 
finding of our study: the role of political trust.  Citizens with low levels of political trust exhibit 
much stronger preferences for pay decreases for politicians than citizens with high levels of trust. 
Unsurprisingly, general economic attitudes also matter for citizens’ attitudes on pay, but trust 
seems to be a more important predictor.  
The relatively importance of trust and inequality attitudes could potentially have been different, 
had we informed our respondents about the existing levels of politicians’ pay. Having knowledge 
about the exact pay levels of politicians could potentially make it easier for respondents to rely on 
their attitudes regarding economic inequality when evaluating pay changes. Future studies may 
therefore want to investigate how respondents react when provided with such information. 
However, studies often find that peoples’ attitudes on policy questions can be remarkably 
unaffected by relevant numbers (Hopkins et al., 2018; Kuklinski et al., 2000; Lawrence and Sides, 
2014; although see Mérola and Hitt, 2015; Schueler and West, 2015). We suspect the same might 
be the case, when citizens are asked to make up their mind on politicians’ pay. Rather than 
carefully considering whether pay levels are in line with their own principles and attitudes on 
income inequality, people may respond more viscerally, and base their response on their general 
affect towards the politicians. 
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What then are the potential consequences of such a strong opposition to high pay for politicians 
among the voters? One potential consequence could be that politicians, fearing the reactions of 
their voters, abstain from pay increases, and thereby gradually let their pay levels drop behind. 
This could potentially affect the skill-levels, effort, and representativeness of politicians, although 
recent studies have found somewhat differing results on the consequences of pay levels for 
politicians (Braendle, 2015; Carnes and Hansen, 2016; Fisman et al., 2015; Hoffman and Lyons, 
2013; Keane and Merlo, 2010). A second, perhaps more insidious consequence of the public 
aversion to high pay for politicians, might be that politicians opt for less transparent reward 
structures for themselves. The fate of the actual proposal from the Danish commission on 
politicians’ pay, is an illustrative example of this. 
The Danish commission on politicians’ pay, Vederlagskommissionen, presented their proposal after 
almost two years of work (Vederlagskommissionen, 2016). On the face of it, their proposal 
contained a large raise in politicians’ pay. However, the proposal also contained the removal of 
several tax exempt salary supplements and adjustments of the lucrative pension schemes enjoyed 
by the politicians. The actual gross change in pay and pensions for the politicians were therefore 
a modest raise for the members of parliament and a decrease in pay for cabinet ministers. 
Nevertheless, despite a prior agreement to accept the proposal of the commission, the main 
parties in the Danish parliament balked at the appearance of a large pay increase, and they ended 
up largely rejecting the proposal, thereby continuing with an opaque reward structure (Rohde and 
Jørgensen, 2016).  
Finally, our experiment suggests that while voters may have very strong opinions regarding 
proposed changes in politicians pay, such proposals do not seem to affect subsequent levels of 
trust in politicians. The absence of such an effect in our experiment could perhaps be explained 
by the notion that talk is cheap, since respondents in the experiment were exposed to proposals 
regarding changes in politicians’ pay rather than actual changes in politicians’ pay. This is a 
limitation of our study, and citizens might react differently to actual changes in pay initiated by 
current politicians with a more obvious self-interest in pay levels. However, we tend to suspect 
that even such actual changes in politicians pay might be interpreted with the same level of 
skepticism and reliance on prior perceptions of politicians as our respondents seemed to do. 
While pay raises confirm perceptions of self-interested politicians, people seem loathe to interpret 
decreases in politicians pay as genuine selflessness on behalf of the politicians. In so far as that is 
the case, this suggests that changes in politicians’ pay will not have an effect on people’s trust in 
politicians. Thus, the relationship between trust and politicians pay may very well be a one-way 
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street: People with low trust towards politicians clearly want politicians to make less than they 
currently do, but lowering the salaries of politicians—or delegating such decision to independent 
entities—does not seem to abate the distrust towards them.  
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ONLINE APPENDIX FOR:  
 
‘CITIZEN ATTITUDES ON POLITICIANS’ PAY:  
TRUST ISSUES ARE NOT SOLVED BY DELEGATION’ 
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
TABLE A1: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE RESPONDENTS AND DANISH POPULATION  
 Sample  Population1 
Gender (female) 50.2%  50,6%  
Age in years, mean (s.d.) 49.8 (17.8)  49.1 (18.0) 
Education (share with tertiary-level education)2 48.0%  34.1% 
1 Population data (18+ years) are from Statistics Denmark (www.statistikbanken.dk).  
2 Data on the educational level of the Danish population based on ages 20-69. 
 
FIGURE A1: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS’ VALUES ACROSS KEY VARIABLES: 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
[1] If there was a parliamentary election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?  
 Social Democrats  
 Social Liberals 
 Conservatives 
 The New Right 
 Socialist People’s Party 
 Liberal Alliance 
 Christian Democrats 
 Danish People’s Party 
 Liberals 
 The Red-Green Alliance 
 The Alternative 
 Other party/ Independent candidate 
 Would not vote / ineligible to vote 
 Would cast blank ballot 
 Don’t know  
 
[2] In politics, one often talks about left and right. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
 0: Left 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10: Right 
 Don’t know 
 
[3] Here are some statements from political discussions. To what extent do you agree or disagree with 
these statements? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don’t 
know 
[3a] For a society to be fair, 
differences in people's standard 
of living should be small. 
      
[3b] Large differences in 
people's incomes are acceptable 
to properly reward differences 
in talents and efforts. 
      
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[4] On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means no trust and 10 means complete trust, how much trust do 
you generally have in the politicians in the Danish parliament? 
 0: No trust 
 1 
 2  
 3 
 4 
 5  
 6 
 7 
 8  
 9 
 10: Complete trust 
 Don’t know 
 
EXPERIMENT [RESPONDENTS RANDOMIZED BETWEEN FIVE CONDITIONS] 
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 4 Condition 5 
[5a] 
[Control group, 
respondents are 
not exposed to 
text or asked 
question, skip 
directly to 
question 6] 
[5a]  
A commission set up by 
the politicians in the 
Danish parliament has 
completed a major study 
of the Danish 
politicians' pay and 
pensions. The 
Commission has six 
members, all of whom 
are appointed by the 
parliamentary 
politicians themselves. 
Most members of the 
Commission are also 
former politicians 
themselves. 
[5b]  
A completely 
independent commission 
has completed a major 
study of the Danish 
politicians’ pay and 
pensions. The 
Commission has six 
members, all of whom 
are experts with 
knowledge of the 
conditions on the 
Danish labor market. 
None of the members of 
the expert group are 
themselves members of 
the parliament. 
[5c]  
A commission set up by 
the politicians in the 
Danish parliament has 
completed a major study 
of the Danish 
politicians' pay and 
pensions. The 
Commission has six 
members, all of whom 
are appointed by the 
parliamentary 
politicians themselves. 
Most members of the 
Commission are also 
former politicians 
themselves. 
[5d]  
A completely 
independent commission 
has completed a major 
study of the Danish 
politicians’ pay and 
pensions. The 
Commission has six 
members, all of whom 
are experts with 
knowledge of the 
conditions on the Danish 
labor market. None of 
the members of the 
expert group are 
themselves members of 
the parliament. 
 The Commission has 
proposed that the wages 
of politicians be 
increased by 17.3 
percent 
The Commission has 
proposed that the wages 
of politicians be 
increased by 17.3 
percent 
The Commission has 
proposed that the wages 
of politicians be 
decreased by 17.3 
percent 
The Commission has 
proposed that the wages 
of politicians be 
decreased by 17.3 
percent 
 Are you opposed to or in favor of this proposal? 
 Strongly opposed 
 Opposed 
 Neither opposed nor in favor 
 In favor 
 Strongly in favor 
 Don’t know 
 
[6] To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the politicians in 
the Danish parliament?  
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Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don’t 
know 
[6a] Most politicians are intelligent             
[6b] Most politicians are skilled              
[6c]Most politicians are knowledgeable             
[6d] Most politicians are likeable             
[6e] Most politicians are conscientious             
[6f] Most politicians are caring             
  
[7] To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the politicians in 
the Danish parliament? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don’t 
know 
[7a] Most politicians are competent people 
who know what they are doing 
      
[7b] In general, you can trust that the 
politicians make the right decisions for the 
country 
      
[7c] Politicians generally have good 
intentions 
      
[7d] Most politicians are in politics only for 
what they can get out of it personally. 
      
 
 
[9] Finally, we have a couple of questions about the commission that proposed a change in the 
politicians’ wages. 
To what degree do you think that the politicians in parliament influenced the proposal of the 
commission? Give your assessment on a scale from 0 to 5, where 0 means that the politicians in 
parliament had no influence on the commission’s proposal, and 5 means that the politicians in 
parliament had a very strong influence on the commission’s proposal.  
 0: The politicians in parliament had no influence on the commission’s proposal  
 1: 
 2: 
 3: 
 4: 
 5: The politicians in parliament had a very strong influence on the commission’s proposal 
 Don’t know 
 
 
 
[10] Do you remember what the commission suggested regarding the politician’s wages? 
 Wages should be increased by 23.4% 
 Wages should be increased by 17.3% 
 Wages should be decreased by 23.4% 
 Wages should be decreased by 17.3% 
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[11 Debriefing] Thank you for your participation in this study. The survey's description of the 
commission that proposed changes in the politicians' salary is based on a real commission, the 
Remuneration Commission, which proposed several changes to the wages and pensions of politicians in 
2016. However, the proposal you read about in this study does not exactly correspond to the 
remuneration commission's actual proposals. We have presented various proposals to participants in this 
study, to investigate the Danes’ attitudes towards the wages of politicians. 
 
---End of survey--- 
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APPENDIX C: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES 
 
TABLE C1: CORRELATIONS 
 
Trust 
(pre-treatment) 
Inequality Att. 
(pre-treatment) 
Trust in 
Warmth 
Trust in 
Competence 
Trust 
(pre-treatment) 
1.00    
Inequality Attitude 
(pre-treatment) 
-0.19 1.00   
Trust in Warmth  0.61 -0.17 1.00  
Trust in Competence  0.63 -0.09 .72 1.00 
Note: the table shows correlations (Pearson’s r) between the listed measures.  
All correlations are significant at p<.001 (n=1978-2006) 
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APPENDIX D: MODELS AND POSTESTIMATIONS 
TABLE D1: MODELS PLANNED IN PRE-REGISTRATION ANALYSIS PLAN 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Support for 
proposal 
Trust in Warmth Trust in 
Competence 
Control Condition   0.00 (.) 0.00 (.) 
Increase suggested by Political Com. 0.00 (.) 0.02 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) 
Increase suggested by Independent Com. 0.14* (0.07) 0.10* (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 
Decrease suggested by Political Com. 0.69*** (0.07) 0.07 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 
Decrease suggested by Independent Com. 0.76*** (0.06) 0.03 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 
General Political Trust 0.52*** (0.06) 0.57*** (0.04) 0.55*** (0.04) 
Control Condition ×  
General Political Trust 
  0.00 (.) 0.00 (.) 
Increase suggested by Political Com. ×  
General Political Trust 
0.00 (.) -0.05 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 
Increase suggested by Independent Com. ×  
General Political Trust 
-0.07 (0.08) -0.08 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05) 
Decrease suggested by Political Com. ×  
General Political Trust 
-0.82*** (0.08) -0.11* (0.05) -0.06 (0.05) 
Decrease suggested by Independent Com. ×  
General Political Trust 
-0.98*** (0.08) -0.06 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) 
Aversion to Economic Inequality -0.02 (0.6) -0.02 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) 
Control Condition × 
Aversion to Economic Inequality 
  0.00 (.) 0.00 (.) 
Increase suggested by Political Com. ×  
Aversion to Economic Inequality 
0.00 (.) -0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.05) 
Increase suggested by Independent Com. ×  
Aversion to Economic Inequality 
-0.11 (0.09) -0.14** (0.05) -0.05 (0.06) 
Decrease suggested by Political Com. ×  
Aversion to Economic Inequality 
0.21* (0.09) -0.05 (0.05) -0.01 (0.05) 
Decrease suggested by Independent Com. ×  
Aversion to Economic Inequality 
0.22* (0.09) -0.03 (0.05) -0.01 (0.05) 
Constant 0.03 (0.05) 0.20*** (0.03) 0.24*** (0.03) 
Observations 1566  1973  1972  
R2 0.457  0.379  0.395  
Notes: OLS regression coefficients (and standard errors). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE D2: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF TRUST AND INEQUALITY AVERSION ON SUPPORT FOR PROPOSALS 
 Trust  Inequality aversion 
 Results from  
Model 1 
Results with 
additional 
covariates 
 Results from  
Model 1 
Results with 
additional covariates 
          
Increase suggested by 
Political Com. 
0.52*** (0.06) 0.45*** (0.06)  -0.02 (0.06) 0.04 (0.08) 
Increase suggested by  
Independent Com. 
0.45*** (0.06) 0.41*** (0.06)  -0.13 (0.07) -0.03 (0.08) 
Decrease suggested by  
Political Com. 
-0.30*** (0.06) -0.30*** (0.06)  0.19** (0.06) 0.25** (0.08) 
Decrease suggested by  
Independent Com. 
-0.46*** (0.06) -0.41*** (0.06)  0.20** (0.07) 0.20* (0.08) 
N 1566  1534   1566  1534  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Note: Table D2 shows the marginal effects of trust and inequality aversion on support for the proposals. 
Results from model 1 are based on the planned regressions shown in table D1, model 1. Results with 
additional controls use are based on regressions which ad to model 1 the covariates gender, age, 
education and party choice, as well as interactions between these covariates and treatment conditions. 
As one can see from table D2, the marginal effects of trust and inequality attitude remains essentially 
unchanged across these models 
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APPENDIX E: PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE, CONDITIONAL ON TREATMENT AND TRUST 
As shown in Figure E1 below, perceptions regarding politicians’ influence on the commission are 
strongly affected by the content of the proposal among respondents with a low level of trust (pre-
treatment). In contrast, respondents with a high level of trust react relatively more strongly to the 
description of the commission’s independence: 
 
Unlike pre-treatment level of trust, pre-treatment level of inequality aversion does not in the same way 
moderate respondent reactions to the experimental conditions, as illustrated in Figure E2 below: 
 
 
